Last fall, while attending a board meeting in Amsterdam, I had a few free hours and made an impromptu visit to the Van Gogh Museum. I often steal time for visits like this—a perk of global business travel for which I am grateful. Wandering the galleries, I found myself before The Courtesan (after Eisen), painted in 1887. Van Gogh had based it on a Japanese woodblock print by Keisai Eisen, which he encountered in the magazine Paris Illustré. He explicitly copied and reinterpreted Eisen’s composition, adding his own vivid border of frogs, cranes, and bamboo.

As I stood there, I imagined the painting as the product of a generative AI model prompted with the query How would van Gogh reinterpret a Japanese woodblock in the style of Keisai Eisen? And I wondered: If van Gogh had used such an AI tool to stimulate his imagination, would Eisen—or his heirs—have had a strong legal claim?  If van Gogh were working today, that might be the case. Two years ago, the US Supreme Court found that Andy Warhol had infringed upon the photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s copyright by using her photo of the musician Prince for a series of silkscreens. The court said the works were not sufficiently transformative to constitute fair use—a provision in the law that allows for others to make limited use of copyrighted material.

A few months later, at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, I visited a Salvador Dalí exhibition. I had always thought of Dalí as a true original genius who conjured surreal visions out of thin air. But the show included several Dutch engravings, including Pieter Bruegel the Elder’s Seven Deadly Sins (1558), that clearly influenced Dalí’s 8 Mortal Sins Suite (1966). The stylistic differences are significant, but the lineage is undeniable. Dalí himself cited Bruegel as a surrealist forerunner, someone who tapped into the same dream logic and bizarre forms that Dalí celebrated. Suddenly, I was seeing Dalí not just as an original but also as a reinterpreter. Should Bruegel have been flattered that Dalí built on his work—or should he have sued him for making it so “grotesque”?

During a later visit to a Picasso exhibit in Milan, I came across a famous informational diagram by the art historian Alfred Barr, mapping how modernist movements like Cubism evolved from earlier artistic traditions. Picasso is often held up as one of modern art’s most original and influential figures, but Barr’s chart made plain the many artists he drew from—Goya, El Greco, Cézanne, African sculptors. This made me wonder: If a generative AI model had been fed all those inputs, might it have produced Cubism? Could it have generated the next great artistic “breakthrough”?

These experiences—spread across three cities and centered on three iconic artists—coalesced into a broader reflection I’d already begun. I had recently spoken with Daniel Ek, the founder of Spotify, about how restrictive copyright laws are in music. Song arrangements and lyrics enjoy longer protection than many pharmaceutical patents. Ek sits at the leading edge of this debate, and he observed that generative AI already produces an astonishing range of music. Some of it is good. Much of it is terrible. But nearly all of it borrows from the patterns and structures of existing work.

Musicians already routinely sue one another for borrowing from previous works. How will the law adapt to a form of artistry that’s driven by prompts and precedent, built entirely on a corpus of existing material?

And the questions don’t stop there. Who, exactly, owns the outputs of a generative model? The user who crafted the prompt? The developer who built the model? The artists whose works were ingested to train it? Will the social forces that shape artistic standing—critics, curators, tastemakers—still hold sway? Or will a new, AI-era hierarchy emerge? If every artist has always borrowed from others, is AI’s generative recombination really so different? And in such a litigious culture, how long can copyright law hold its current form? The US Copyright Office has begun to tackle the thorny issues of ownership and says that generative outputs can be copyrighted if they are sufficiently human-authored. But it is playing catch-up in a rapidly evolving field. 

Different industries are responding in different ways. The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences recently announced that filmmakers’ use of generative AI would not disqualify them from Oscar contention—and that they wouldn’t be required to disclose when they’d used the technology. Several acclaimed films, including Oscar winner The Brutalist, incorporated AI into their production processes.

The music world, meanwhile, continues to wrestle with its definitions of originality. Consider the recent lawsuit against Ed Sheeran. In 2016, he was sued by the heirs of Ed Townsend, co-writer of Marvin Gaye’s “Let’s Get It On,” who claimed that Sheeran’s “Thinking Out Loud” copied the earlier song’s melody, harmony, and rhythm. When the case finally went to trial in 2023, Sheeran brought a guitar to the stand. He played the disputed four-chord progression—I–iii–IV–V—and wove together a mash-up of songs built on the same foundation. The point was clear: These are the elemental units of songwriting. After a brief deliberation, the jury found Sheeran not liable.

Reflecting after the trial, Sheeran said: “These chords are common building blocks … No one owns them or the way they’re played, in the same way no one owns the colour blue.”

Exactly. Whether it’s expressed with a guitar, a paintbrush, or a generative algorithm, creativity has always been built on what came before.

I don’t consider this essay to be great art. But I should be transparent: I relied extensively on ChatGPT while drafting it. I began with a rough outline, notes typed on my phone in museum galleries, and transcripts from conversations with colleagues. I uploaded older writing samples to give the model a sense of my voice. Then I used the tool to shape a draft, which I revised repeatedly—by hand and with help from an editor—over several weeks.

There may still be phrases or sentences in here that came directly from the model. But I’ve iterated so much that I no longer know which ones. Nor, I suspect, could any reader—or any AI detector. (In fact, Grammarly found that 0% of this text appeared to be AI-generated.)

Many people today remain uneasy about using these tools. They worry it’s cheating, or feel embarrassed to admit that they’ve sought such help. I’ve moved past that. I assume all my students at Harvard Business School are using AI. I assume most academic research begins with literature scanned and synthesized by these models. And I assume that many of the essays I now read in leading publications were shaped, at least in part, by generative tools.

Why? Because we are professionals. And professionals adopt efficiency tools early. Generative AI joins a long lineage that includes the word processor, the search engine, and editing tools like Grammarly. The question is no longer Who’s using AI? but Why wouldn’t you?

I recognize the counterargument, notably put forward by Nicholas Thompson, CEO of the Atlantic: that content produced with AI assistance should not be eligible for copyright protection, because it blurs the boundaries of authorship. I understand the instinct. AI recombines vast corpora of preexisting work, and the results can feel derivative or machine-like.

But when I reflect on the history of creativity—van Gogh reworking Eisen, Dalí channeling Bruegel, Sheeran defending common musical DNA—I’m reminded that recombination has always been central to creation. The economist Joseph Schumpeter famously wrote that innovation is less about invention than “the novel reassembly of existing ideas.” If we tried to trace and assign ownership to every prior influence, we’d grind creativity to a halt.

From the outset, I knew the tools had transformative potential. What I underestimated was how quickly they would become ubiquitous across industries and in my own daily work.

Our copyright system has never required total originality. It demands meaningful human input. That standard should apply in the age of AI as well. When people thoughtfully engage with these models—choosing prompts, curating inputs, shaping the results—they are creating. The medium has changed, but the impulse remains the same: to build something new from the materials we inherit.


Nitin Nohria is the George F. Baker Jr. Professor at Harvard Business School and its former dean. He is also the chair of Thrive Capital, an early investor in several prominent AI firms, including OpenAI.

MIT Technology Review’s editorial guidelines state that generative AI should not be used to draft articles unless the article is meant to illustrate the capabilities of such tools and its use is clearly disclosed. 

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Back in February, I flew to Amsterdam to report on a high-stakes experiment the city had recently conducted: a pilot program for what it called Smart Check, which was its attempt to create an effective, fair, and unbiased predictive algorithm to try to detect welfare fraud. But the city fell short of its lofty goals—and, with our partners at Lighthouse Reports and the Dutch newspaper Trouw, we tried to get to the bottom of why. You can read about it in our deep dive published last week.

For an American reporter, it’s been an interesting time to write a story on “responsible AI” in a progressive European city—just as ethical considerations in AI deployments appear to be disappearing in the United States, at least at the national level. 

For example, a few weeks before my trip, the Trump administration rescinded Biden’s executive order on AI safety and DOGE began turning to AI to decide which federal programs to cut. Then, more recently, House Republicans passed a 10-year moratorium on US states’ ability to regulate AI (though it has yet to be passed by the Senate). 

What all this points to is a new reality in the United States where responsible AI is no longer a priority (if it ever genuinely was). 

But this has also made me think more deeply about the stakes of deploying AI in situations that directly affect human lives, and about what success would even look like. 

When Amsterdam’s welfare department began developing the algorithm that became Smart Check, the municipality followed virtually every recommendation in the responsible-AI playbook: consulting external experts, running bias tests, implementing technical safeguards, and seeking stakeholder feedback. City officials hoped the resulting algorithm could avoid causing the worst types of harm inflicted by discriminatory AI over nearly a decade. 

After talking to a large number of people involved in the project and others who would potentially be affected by it, as well as some experts who did not work on it, it’s hard not to wonder if the city could ever have succeeded in its goals when neither “fairness” nor even “bias” has a universally agreed-upon definition. The city was treating these issues as technical ones that could be answered by reweighting numbers and figures—rather than political and philosophical questions that society as a whole has to grapple with.

On the afternoon that I arrived in Amsterdam, I sat down with Anke van der Vliet, a longtime advocate for welfare beneficiaries who served on what’s called the Participation Council, a 15-member citizen body that represents benefits recipients and their advocates.

The city had consulted the council during Smart Check’s development, but van der Vliet was blunt in sharing the committee’s criticisms of the plans. Its members simply didn’t want the program. They had well-placed fears of discrimination and disproportionate impact, given that fraud is found in only 3% of applications.

To the city’s credit, it did respond to some of their concerns and make changes in the algorithm’s design—like removing from consideration factors, such as age, whose inclusion could have had a discriminatory impact. But the city ignored the Participation Council’s main feedback: its recommendation to stop development altogether. 

Van der Vliet and other welfare advocates I met on my trip, like representatives from the Amsterdam Welfare Union, described what they see as a number of challenges faced by the city’s some 35,000 benefits recipients: the indignities of having to constantly re-prove the need for benefits, the increases in cost of living that benefits payments do not reflect, and the general feeling of distrust between recipients and the government. 

City welfare officials themselves recognize the flaws of the system, which “is held together by rubber bands and staples,” as Harry Bodaar, a senior policy advisor to the city who focuses on welfare fraud enforcement, told us. “And if you’re at the bottom of that system, you’re the first to fall through the cracks.”

So the Participation Council didn’t want Smart Check at all, even as Bodaar and others working in the department hoped that it could fix the system. It’s a classic example of a “wicked problem,” a social or cultural issue with no one clear answer and many potential consequences. 

After the story was published, I heard from Suresh Venkatasubramanian, a former tech advisor to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy who co-wrote Biden’s AI Bill of Rights (now rescinded by Trump). “We need participation early on from communities,” he said, but he added that it also matters what officials do with the feedback—and whether there is “a willingness to reframe the intervention based on what people actually want.” 

Had the city started with a different question—what people actually want—perhaps it might have developed a different algorithm entirely. As the Dutch digital rights advocate Hans De Zwart put it to us, “We are being seduced by technological solutions for the wrong problems … why doesn’t the municipality build an algorithm that searches for people who do not apply for social assistance but are entitled to it?” 

These are the kinds of fundamental questions AI developers will need to consider, or they run the risk of repeating (or ignoring) the same mistakes over and over again.

Venkatasubramanian told me he found the story to be “affirming” in highlighting the need for “those in charge of governing these systems”  to “ask hard questions … starting with whether they should be used at all.”

But he also called the story “humbling”: “Even with good intentions, and a desire to benefit from all the research on responsible AI, it’s still possible to build systems that are fundamentally flawed, for reasons that go well beyond the details of the system constructions.” 

To better understand this debate, read our full story here. And if you want more detail on how we ran our own bias tests after the city gave us unprecedented access to the Smart Check algorithm, check out the methodology over at Lighthouse. (For any Dutch speakers out there, here’s the companion story in Trouw.) Thanks to the Pulitzer Center for supporting our reporting. 

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

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The race to build ever larger AI models is slowing down. The industry’s focus is shifting toward agents—systems that can act autonomously, make decisions, and negotiate on users’ behalf.

But what would happen if both a customer and a seller were using an AI agent? A recent study put agent-to-agent negotiations to the test and found that stronger agents can exploit weaker ones to get a better deal. It’s a bit like entering court with a seasoned attorney versus a rookie: You’re technically playing the same game, but the odds are skewed from the start.

The paper, posted to arXiv’s preprint site, found that access to more advanced AI models —those with greater reasoning ability, better training data, and more parameters—could lead to consistently better financial deals, potentially widening the gap between people with greater resources and technical access and those without. If agent-to-agent interactions become the norm, disparities in AI capabilities could quietly deepen existing inequalities.

“Over time, this could create a digital divide where your financial outcomes are shaped less by your negotiating skill and more by the strength of your AI proxy,” says Jiaxin Pei, a postdoc researcher at Stanford University and one of the authors of the study.

In their experiment, the researchers had AI models play the roles of buyers and sellers in three scenarios, negotiating deals for electronics, motor vehicles, and real estate. Each seller agent received the product’s specs, wholesale cost, and retail price, with instructions to maximize profit. Buyer agents, in contrast, were given a budget, the retail price, and ideal product requirements and were tasked with driving the price down.

Each agent had some, but not all, relevant details. This setup mimics many real-world negotiation conditions, where parties lack full visibility into each other’s constraints or objectives.

The differences in performance were striking. OpenAI’s ChatGPT-o3 delivered the strongest overall negotiation results, followed by the company’s GPT-4.1 and o4-mini. GPT-3.5, which came out almost two years earlier and is the oldest model included in the study,  lagged significantly in both roles—it made the least money as the seller and spent the most as a buyer. DeepSeek R1 and V3 also performed well, particularly as sellers. Qwen2.5 trailed behind, though it showed more strength in the buyer role.

One notable pattern was that some agents often failed to close deals but effectively maximize profit in the sales they did make, while others completed more negotiations but settled for lower margins. GPT-4.1 and DeepSeek R1 struck the best balance, achieving both solid profits and high completion rates.

Beyond financial losses, the researchers found that AI agents could get stuck in prolonged negotiation loops without reaching an agreement—or end talks prematurely, even when instructed to push for the best possible deal. Even the most capable models were prone to these failures.

“The result was very surprising to us,” says Pei. “We all believe LLMs are pretty good these days, but they can be untrustworthy in high-stakes scenarios.”

The disparity in negotiation performance could be caused by a number of factors, says Pei. These include differences in training data and the models’ ability to reason and infer missing information. The precise causes remain uncertain, but one factor seems clear: Model size plays a significant role. According to the scaling laws of large language models, capabilities tend to improve with an increase in the number of parameters. This trend held true in the study: Even within the same model family, larger models were consistently able to strike better deals as both buyers and sellers.

This study is part of a growing body of research warning about the risks of deploying AI agents in real-world financial decision-making. Earlier this month, a group of researchers from multiple universities argued that LLM agents should be evaluated primarily on the basis of their risk profiles, not just their peak performance. Current benchmarks, they say, emphasize accuracy and return-based metrics, which measure how well an agent can perform at its best but overlook how safely it can fail. Their research also found that even top-performing models are more likely to break down under adversarial conditions.

The team suggests that in the context of real-world finances, a tiny weakness—even a 1% failure rate—could expose the system to systemic risks. They recommend that AI agents be “stress tested” before being put into practical use.

Hancheng Cao, an incoming assistant professor at Emory University, notes that the price negotiation study has limitations. “The experiments were conducted in simulated environments that may not fully capture the complexity of real-world negotiations or user behavior,” says Cao. 

Pei, the researcher, says researchers and industry practitioners are experimenting with a variety of strategies to reduce these risks. These include refining the prompts given to AI agents, enabling agents to use external tools or code to make better decisions, coordinating multiple models to double-check each other’s work, and fine-tuning models on domain-specific financial data—all of which have shown promise in improving performance.

Many prominent AI shopping tools are currently limited to product recommendation. In April, for example, Amazon launched “Buy for Me,” an AI agent that helps customers find and buy products from other brands’ sites if Amazon doesn’t sell them directly.

While price negotiation is rare in consumer e-commerce, it’s more common in business-to-business transactions. Alibaba.com has rolled out a sourcing assistant called Accio, built on its open-source Qwen models, that helps businesses find suppliers and research products. The company told MIT Technology Review it has no plans to automate price bargaining so far, citing high risk.

That may be a wise move. For now, Pei advises consumers to treat AI shopping assistants as helpful tools—not stand-ins for humans in decision-making.

“I don’t think we are fully ready to delegate our decisions to AI shopping agents,” he says. “So maybe just use it as an information tool, not a negotiator.”

Correction: We removed a line about agent deployment

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